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Trends in Communist Propaganda

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TRENDS

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TASS TRENDS
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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN KISSINGER TRIP, DROPS GENEVA DEADLINE

As Secretary Kissinger began his latest round of diplomatic talks in the Middle East, Soviet media took a dim view of any new Israeli-Egyptian agreement, advancing a variety of objections to the U.S. "step-by-step" approach. Moscow criticisms include charges that this method aims at dividing the Arabs and ignoring the Palestinian problem, and produces only a semblance of progress. Offsetting the current U.S. diplomatic efforts, comment has extolled Gromyko's recent visits to Damascus and Cairo in an attempt to sustain the image of active Soviet involvement in support of Arab interests and Palestinian rights. Moscow quietly dropped the Geneva talks deadline advocated in the 3 February Soviet-Syrian statement when Cairo did not endorse it. Soviet media have reverted to the standard appeals for "immediate" resumption of the Geneva conference--professing Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian unanimity on this point--and calls for the participation of "all sides involved," including representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Moscow has reported but as yet offered no comment on an Egyptian Government memorandum, addressed to the Soviet Union and the United States as Geneva conference cochairmen as well as to the UN secretary general, requesting that PLO representatives be invited to the conference.

KISSINGER MISSION Moscow has typically played down any prospects for a new U.S.-mediated agreement between Egypt and Israel while carping about what it calls U.S.-Israeli collusion on "intermediate steps" and "other half-measures" designed to avoid a final settlement and satisfaction of legitimate Arab claims. TASS on 6 February, in reporting the State Department announcement of Secretary Kissinger's itinerary, noted that following his Mideast trip he would meet in Geneva with Gromyko on 16-17 February and "exchange opinions on problems of mutual interest."*

* In an interview with the London TIMES published on the 10th, Egyptian President as-Sadat said that Kissinger and Gromyko would discuss the date for a rescheduled Brezhnev visit to the Middle East. A Cairo radio account of the interview on the 11th additionally cited as-Sadat as saying that Brezhnev "may postpone the date of his visit to Egypt until after his visit to the United States this summer. However, Brezhnev's visit to Egypt will most probably take place before the conclusion of a final agreement for the settlement of the crisis." Soviet media, on the other hand, have thus far provided no indication of when or whether Brezhnev's Mideast visit is to be rescheduled.

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The Secretary was cited in a TASS dispatch, published in PRAVDA on 5 February, as having said at the National Press Club on the 4th that any step taken should be considered "an interim step toward a final peace." The TASS report did not include his remark that he would not be making the trip if he did not see "some possibility of progress in further negotiations." Reporting his departure for the Mideast, TASS on the 10th said "observers here" in Washington saw the tour as another U.S. attempt at a "so-called step-by-step settlement of the conflict. TASS cited the Secretary as saying, in an interview with Dutch television in Washington, that he "never regarded resumption of the Geneva conference as an alternative to a step-by-step approach." But TASS did not note his additional remark that he had "always said that at some point Geneva should be reconvened."

Other Soviet comment, while not mentioning Secretary Kissinger explicitly, has been strongly critical of his diplomatic approach. A Timoshkin commentary broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 7th, for example, charged that a viable Mideast peace "cannot be achieved in this explosive region by means of partial measures or quiet diplomacy" and that a new partial settlement "away from the Geneva conference" would serve only U.S. and Israeli interests.

Some Soviet comment has noted reports of U.S. pressure on Israel to adopt particular negotiating positions with Egypt. TASS on the 7th, citing the Paris LE FIGARO, was notably explicit in this regard, stating that U.S.-Israeli Mideast negotiating strategy was intended "to gain time" to overcome the energy crisis and that the United States wanted Israel to withdraw troops from the Sinai peninsula without any compensation, other than "Egypt's unofficial promise not to resort to military operations in the course of two to three years." The report also asserted that future U.S. military and economic aid had been made contingent on Israel's acceptance of the U.S. "recommendations." But an Arabic-language broadcast of Radio Peace and Progress on the 10th did not suggest any U.S. efforts to influence Israel when it cited the New York TIMES on Israeli demands for Egyptian assurance not to attack Israel for a certain period and Egyptian agreement on "a number of insignificant concessions." The broadcast charged that "this game" was delaying the actual solution of the Mideast crisis, and wondered about the optimism of some Arabs concerning "the ability of American diplomacy" to settle the problem.

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RELATIONS WITH
SYRIA, EGYPT

Followup comment on Gromyko's Mideast trip stressing good Soviet relations with Damascus and Cairo was typified in remarks by Mideast specialist Belyayev on the 9 February Moscow radio roundtable program. Asking rhetorically what the main result of Gromyko's talks had been, Belyayev said it was, first, the confirmation of Soviet cooperation with Egypt and Syria "in the future in all fields," citing specifically economic and political cooperation "and also Soviet support for the defense potential of these two Arab states." Belyayev made a special effort to depict Soviet-Egyptian relations as "stable and friendly," explicitly seeking to counter Western and Arab reports of a persistent rift in the relationship. Noting that "certain people, including some in Egypt," had at times cast doubt on the "essence and outlook" for Soviet-Egyptian relations, he asserted that, to the contrary, Gromyko's visit had shown that the relations were good and were based not only on the sides' obligations under the 1971 treaty, but also on their efforts to make their friendship "constantly operative."

His remarks parallel recent statements by President as-Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmi professing a marked improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Fahmi, for instance, in a statement carried by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 8th, said that "letters exchanged" between as-Sadat and Brezhnev--what he called a "direct dialog since last January"--as well as Gromyko's visit, had placed Soviet-Egyptian relations "on a firm basis" and removed the "strain noted now and then." Similarly, as-Sadat in a 9 February interview carried in London TIMES on the 10th characterized his country's relations with Moscow as "much improved" by Gromyko's visit, after a "difficult period." In the TIMES interview as-Sadat did not mention his "dialog" with Brezhnev over the past month to which Fahmi referred. Fahmi's remarks come in conjunction with the cryptic passage in the Soviet-Egyptian statement on Gromyko's visit which "stressed the great importance of the exchange of opinions" between Brezhnev and as-Sadat. Other than a Brezhnev message reported by MENA on 25 January, which apparently concerned the Gromyko visit, only two other Soviet leaders' messages to as-Sadat are known to have been reported by Cairo media in January. On the 8th, MENA said the president had received a reply from Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny to his new year's congratulations, and on the 14th MENA reported their congratulations to him on the new Hegira year.

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PALESTINIAN
ISSUE

Against a background of recent Arab media reports that the PLO is increasingly frustrated over the lack of progress in getting a hearing for the Palestinian case, Moscow has continued to counsel Palestinian support for the Geneva conference. Soviet comment insists that only a comprehensive settlement will serve Palestinian interests: A Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 5th, for example, charged that Israel and the United States want to keep the PLO from participating in the conference and seek through a step-by-step approach to "delay indefinitely" the solution of the Palestinian problem. But Moscow has not as yet commented on the Egyptian initiative, announced in the Cairo press on the 9th, asking the Geneva cosponsors for an invitation to the PLO. And Moscow has continued to withhold formal recognition and support to the PLO, although some commentators--such as Belyayev on Moscow radio's 8 February "International Situation" program--have occasionally referred to the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians." Nor has there been any confirmation from Soviet media of Cairo press reports that a high-level delegation headed by PLO chairman 'Arafat will soon visit Moscow, responding to an invitation extended by Brezhnev in a letter given 'Arafat by Gromyko in Damascus.

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TURKEY

USSR EXPLOITS AID CUTOFF TO DENIGRATE ANKARA'S U.S., NATO TIES

Moscow in its Turkish-language broadcasts has seized on the 5 February suspension of U.S. military aid to Turkey to dramatize what it portrays as the unreliability of Ankara's U.S. and NATO support. Such broadcasts have replayed Turkish expressions of dissatisfaction and have held up the aid cutoff as an example of Washington's use of aid to pressure its allies. Broadcasts for Turkish audiences have pointedly neglected to explain the reason for any pressure, failing to mention Turkey's role in the Cyprus problem which led to the suspension. Other Moscow media, however, have acknowledged, as in a TASS Russian-language report on the 6th, that the aid would resume after "substantial progress" was achieved in the Cyprus talks.

Commentaries beamed to Turkish listeners have emphasized the repercussions of the aid cutoff, singling out Prime Minister Irmak's statement that Ankara would need to review its relations with the United States and NATO. Citing further Turkish reaction, a talk on the 7th concluded that Turkey "may even leave" NATO. A commentary on the 5th underlined the "increasing frequency" of U.S. pressure against Turkey and other countries, citing the U.S. role in the 1972 opium poppy ban and Secretary Kissinger's recent remarks on the possibility of U.S. intervention in the Mideast. It seemed to praise Ankara's independent stance in pointing out that the United States regularly applied such pressure against "headstrong" weaker allies. Similarly, the commentary on the 7th interpreted the suspension as reflecting Washington's dissatisfaction over Turkey's "tendency in recent years to take a number of new steps in a political course that does not suit NATO or the United States," adding that it also reflected Ankara's dissatisfaction with U.S. "adjustment" of its policies in the Eastern Mediterranean and in NATO.

Broadcasts by Turkish-language communist clandestine stations have also criticized Turkey's relationship with the United States and NATO, claiming that the Turkish Communist Party (TCP) was the "first" to criticize Ankara's alliances. Unlike Moscow, the clandestines strongly attacked the Turkish leadership. "Our Radio" on the 7th, for example, contended that the "present outcry" of the government leaders was a sham as none of them had called for withdrawal from NATO. The "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" maintained on the 9th that it was the Turkish "governments and junta generals" that had allowed Turkish soldiers to die in Korea and Cyprus in the interests of "U.S. imperialists and NATO warmongers."

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

U.S. BUDGET, JACKSON CANDIDACY SEEN AS NEGATIVE FACTORS

Soviet media continue to point to favorable prospects for progress in detente while voicing criticism of such specific aspects of U.S. policy as increased expenditures allocated for defense in President Ford's draft budget submitted on 3 February. And after preoccupation since mid-January with the "discriminatory" U.S. trade bill, Moscow comment on Senator Jackson's formal announcement that he will seek the presidential nomination has focused on his role in that bill. At the same time, both IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA duly noted President Ford's remarks, in his 4 February Atlanta press conference, that he was looking forward to Brezhnev's projected U.S. trip next summer and to the conclusion of an arms accord, as agreed at Vladivostock. Comment commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Yalta conference hailed that event as a prime example of successful negotiations between "sovereign equal" parties.

MILITARY BUDGET Criticism of increases in the U.S. military budget appeared in a 9 February CPSU Central Committee resolution, preparatory for this year's observance of the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II, which tempered support for East-West detente with a warning regarding the "growing" military budgets of the imperialist states. Earlier on the 5th, an IZVESTIYA commentary by Kondrashov pointed to the irony of the U.S. deficit budget for the "jubilee" year of 1976 and noted the discrepancy between the cutting back of social programs and increased expenditures for defense. Kondrashov discounted White House justifications that the record expenditures were needed to maintain combat readiness in the face of rising costs and attributed the expenditures to Pentagon influence, adding that they were opposed by many Americans and were contrary to the development of international detente.

Also on the 5th, Secretary Schlesinger was singled out for particular criticism by RED STAR as foremost among those registering "irksome insinuations about 'the Soviet danger'" to justify the military budget. The paper also saw a large majority of Americans as favoring detente and U.S.-Soviet cooperation and opposing increased military appropriations. Similarly critical of alleged Pentagon influence in the record proposed U.S. defense budget, a Pozner talk broadcast in English to North America on the 9th pointed out that in contrast, the 1975 Soviet defense budget was down by 200 million rubles, or seven-

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tenths of one percent, from last year. The commentary added that the share of defense expenditures in the total Soviet budget had dropped from 11.1 to 8.4 percent during the past five years. The average Soviet citizen, it concluded, has difficulty reconciling growing U.S. military expenditures with professed peaceful policies, "especially" in view of Soviet budgetary reductions.

SENATOR JACKSON'S
CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT

In reporting Senator Jackson's announcement of his candidacy, TASS on the 7th reiterated past invective in calling the senator a functionary of "reactionary circles of the military-industrial complex," rightwing labor, and "Zionist" organizations and an opponent of U.S.-Soviet detente. Subsequent commentaries in English to North America, as well as Moscow radio's roundtable on the 9th, took the senator to task for his role in the U.S. trade bill, and in a talk by Pozner on the 10th, for allegedly trying to shift the blame to Secretary Kissinger for the collapse of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement. A Valentin Zorin talk on the 8th declared flatly regarding Jackson that "this politician does not possess a broad political outlook, which is a must for any top-caliber figure." The Warsaw radio, on the other hand, took a characteristically more detached view in a talk on the 7th which noted that "many observers think Jackson has a chance."

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S A L T

USA INSTITUTE'S TROFIMENKO COMMENTS ON RESUMPTION OF TALKS

Moscow's most authoritative comment on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) pegged to the resumption of the talks on 31 January came in a 4 February PRAVDA article by USA Institute political-military strategist G. Trofimenko. Adopting the generally optimistic tone of recent Soviet comment on SALT, Trofimenko pointed to the approving reception by U.S. "authoritative organizations and influential figures" of the understandings reached at the Vladivostok summit. But Trofimenko also cautioned that "hasty decisions" were not possible in the strategic arms field, not only because of "objective" factors but also due to "artificial difficulties" created by "cold war disciplines" such as Senator Jackson.

The article made no specific mention of the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement difficulties, but that seemed clearly in mind when Trofimenko attributed to "U.S. political circles" the assessment that there is now an opportunity, under conditions of "stabilized military balance," to clear the obstacles and difficulties in "certain other" areas of Soviet-U.S. cooperation. Routine comment in recent weeks has observed that the trade agreement setback should not and would not have a detrimental effect on SALT and on detente in general.

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT Referring to approval by "most Americans" of the Vladivostok results, Trofimenko singled out in particular favorable remarks by several senators and the draft Vladivostok resolution introduced in January by Senators Kennedy, Mondale and Mathias. Trofimenko called the resolution a practical expression of the senators' "constructive approach," and described it as approving in principle the November summit understanding and as calling for "further mutual arms limitations and cutbacks." He indicated satisfaction that the resolution had been amended since it was first offered in December, and that in the later version the senators "increased the constructive spirit of the resolution and focused attention on the importance of what had been achieved" at Vladivostok. Trofimenko seemed to be suggesting that Moscow now hoped for sufficient senatorial support for any agreement reached in the current SALT session. Moscow's reaction to the original Vladivostok resolution in December had been mixed. Comment approvingly noted senatorial support for the Vladivostok stipulations but criticized the senators' complaint that the agreed missile ceilings were "too high."

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CAUTIONARY REMARKS

While seeming to look on the bright side, Trofimenko at the same time pointed out that this was not a field for hasty decisions, and he recalled that it took two and a half years to make the transition from the May 1972 interim agreement. He cited the "exceptional technical complexity" in comparing two strategic weapons complexes, and the existence of "various 'strategic asymmetries' resulting from the two countries' differing geographical positions, and so forth." Although Moscow media have not acknowledged the Soviet agreement not to require inclusion of the French and British nuclear forces and U.S. forward-based systems in the Vladivostok ceilings, some Moscow domestic broadcast comment in recent weeks has been particularly defensive in arguing that the U.S.-Soviet understandings do not imply that the USSR is conducting some sort of "unilateral disarmament." Commentators have maintained that all Soviet "security interests" will be met.

Where Soviet commentators have pointed out that the nuclear forces of "other states" will be taken into account in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations, only PRAVDA's authoritative political observer Yuriy Zhukov, in his 1 February Moscow television program, has explicitly named China as one of these "other states." He in effect denied that the USSR was lessening its defense posture against the Chinese as a result of any Soviet-U.S. disarmament measure. Although Moscow radio did not rebroadcast this particular Zhukov television program, the substance of Zhukov's remarks has been reported by Budapest media.

In his PRAVDA article, Trofimenko also complained of "another kind" of obstacle created by such critics as Senator Jackson who "actively attack" the Vladivostok understanding. And the author failed to suggest any time frame for conclusion of the current Geneva negotiations. Comment immediately after the Vladivostok meeting in November, in anticipation of a projected Brezhnev visit to the United States this summer, had spoken vaguely of concluding a pact "in the near future" or "soon." Soviet media have kept Brezhnev's projected visit alive in recent reports on Administration statements on the trip, such as President Ford's remarks at his press conference on 4 February.

MILSTEYN ON BACKGROUND
TO VLADIVOSTOK

Another USA Institute observer on U.S.-Soviet strategic relations, M.A. Milsteyn, discussed the background and significance of the Vladivostok understandings in an article in the February issue of USA (signed to press 9 January). Milsteyn's article was notable for a unique discussion of the reasons why the Vladivostok

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understandings could not be reached earlier. He attributed this not only to the technical problems involved in SALT but also to the status of former President Nixon and Watergate. In addition to the technical problems, Milsteyn said, there were, "in the opinion of the Americans, difficulties" linked to U.S. "domestic political life and, in particular, the so-called 'Watergate affair.'" Milsteyn cited TIME magazine to the effect that Nixon, "burdened by the unpleasantness of Watergate," was incapable of reaching an acceptable SALT agreement at the then-scheduled July 1974 summit. He then went on to attribute to Secretary Kissinger a statement that even if Watergate had been disregarded, Nixon was in a difficult situation in 1974 and was about to end his term in office and could not stand for reelection. Thus, Milsteyn continued, "in H. Kissinger's words, he was a 'lame duck.'" Milsteyn of course did not say how the Kremlin saw the situation in mid-1974, but let his readers infer that a similar conclusion had been drawn by the Soviet leadership.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING NOTES U.S. ECONOMIC ILLS, SEES HEIGHTENED ARMS RACE

Peking has reported fully on U.S. economic problems through NCNA dispatches on President Ford's economic and budget messages to Congress, while focusing on the President's call for increased military preparedness to deter Soviet advances as a confirmation of China's expectation of heightened "superpower" contention. The emphasis in NCNA reportage is consistent with the Chinese thesis, formalized at the January Peking National People's Congress, that there is a tandem development of the capitalist world's economic crisis and the superpowers' rivalry for world control. Peking claims these factors have enhanced the prospects for either world war or revolution. The NCNA reports depicted the United States in neutral terms--as a great power firmly determined to defend its interests against its major international adversary--and mentioned only briefly the President's request for increased aid to Israel and to the foes of China's allies in Vietnam and Cambodia.

NCNA's 4 February review of the President's budget message described it as calling for a "marked increase" in military expenses and an "all-round reinforcement of U.S. military strength" against Moscow that produced an "unprecedentedly huge budget." It highlighted the message's statements that U.S. diplomacy abroad was backed by a strong national defense and that Washington should be prepared to cope with "potential threats" from the USSR. NCNA highlighted sections of the message calling for wideranging advances in military expenses, including the areas of strategic arms, research and development, infantry, armor, and naval development. On 6 February NCNA reported Secretary Schlesinger's defense of the President's budget before the Senate Armed Services Committee, including passages pointing out the Administration's determination to meet Soviet challenges wherever they affect U.S. "vital interests" abroad and its desire to have a strong military structure to handle the "risk" of "confrontation, crisis and miscalculation" with the USSR.

NCNA on the 5th reported the President's pessimistic view of the U.S. economy in his annual economic report, noting his admission that the United States is in a severe recession and that his

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proposed solutions would not produce swift or immediate results. The report focused on what it said were "inherent contradictions" in the President's goals of ending recession and reducing unemployment, controlling inflation, and reducing U.S. vulnerability to oil embargos. It noted the President's admission that government action to achieve one of these objectives sometimes works to the detriment of another, concluding that the Administration "has found no way out" of the current crisis.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MAJOR PRAVDA ARTICLE SCORES "ANTISOCIALIST" CHINESE CONGRESS

Moscow's first authoritative assessment of China's Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), held from 13 to 17 January, came in the 5 February PRAVDA under the byline "I. Aleksandrov," a pseudonym long associated with major policy pronouncements.* Moscow's two-week delay before offering authoritative comment is consistent with its belated response to the 10th Chinese Communist Party Congress in August 1973; the first major comment then was a Bovin article in IZVESTIYA on 12 September, followed by remarks by Brezhnev in a 24 September speech in Tashkent.

The current Aleksandrov article asserted that the NPC had confirmed the Maoist leadership's anti-Soviet, "antisocialist" policies and it saw only a distant hope that Chinese policy might become more favorable to the USSR. The article avoided any discussion of the new PRC leadership alignment or of Chou En-lai's specific calls in his 13 January congress report for Soviet action on bilateral relations and the border problem. The article noted that even though divisions remain among Peking leaders, the congress had effected "a kind of compromise between competing groupings within the Peking elite." At the same time it reiterated recent Soviet expressions of belief that the Chinese "people" eventually would change Peking's present anti-Soviet stance--a theme developed by Brezhnev in a 6 October 1974 Berlin speech. Aleksandrov advised that "time will tell" the fate of Peking's current policies and affirmed that "it is for the Chinese people to decide their historical destiny." Brezhnev in Berlin had admonished that the "grim page in history" caused by Peking's anti-Soviet position "will eventually be turned by the Chinese people themselves."

Comparing the newly adopted Chinese constitution with the original PRC constitution of 1954, Aleksandrov attacked Peking's current hostility to the USSR and the pursuit of world peace, its calls affirming the inevitability of world war, and its alleged proclivity to interfere in other states' internal affairs. He accused the Chinese of wishing "to bask in the heat of a world conflagration"

* The last previous "Aleksandrov" articles on China appeared in PRAVDA on 7 and 26 August 1973. The most recent one, as always, is published across the bottom of inside pages of the paper, the same position accorded the authoritative editorial article.

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in order to achieve more expeditiously their "great-man hegemonist aims." He said that the Chinese leaders have broken with scientific socialism and have moved further down the path of enmity toward the USSR and socialist countries.

On PRC internal policy, the article said that the new constitution serves to consolidate a rule of terror by a "narrow military-bureaucratic grouping," deprives the people of numerous individual and collective rights guaranteed under the previous constitution, and enforces rule by "bayonet" throughout the country. Claiming that the document shows the Maoist leaders' distrust of the people and their opposition to rightful popular interests, Aleksandrov concluded that the people, "who are vitally interested in China's movement along a really socialist path," will eventually cause the termination of the Maoist policies and will pursue the path of "genuinely socialist development" and of "restoring friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union."

SOVIET BORDER NEGOTIATIONS CHIEF RETURNS TO PEKING

TASS reported on 12 February that Ilichev, chief of the Soviet delegation on the Sino-Soviet border talks, had returned that day to Peking, after an absence of six months. The brief report, similar to the 25 June 1974 report of the negotiator's last return to Peking, noted that he was greeted at the airport by the Soviet ambassador and the head of the Chinese delegation to the talks. As usual, there has been no Chinese report of the arrival. While last summer's TASS dispatch had identified PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chan as the head of the Chinese delegation, the current report revealed that Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung had taken over as head of the Chinese side.

Ilichev's return after a prolonged absence has come in the wake of recent, unprecedented Chinese complaints over Soviet intransigence in the border talks, centered in Chou En-lai's call in his 13 January report to the NPC for the USSR to negotiate seriously and "do something" to improve the current stalemate.* Peking has not originated

* Chou En-lai's 13 January complaint is discussed in the FBIS SPECIAL REPORT ON COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of 30 January 1975, "The Fourth Chinese National People's Congress," pages 13-14. A major article on the border issue in a recently revived journal, HISTORICAL STUDIES, is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 10 January 1975, "Peking Ends Silence on Border Talks, Assails Moscow's Stance."

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further comment on the talks since Chou's remarks, but a 4 February article in a Hong Kong Chinese Communist newspaper, TA KUNG PAO, conveyed continuing Chinese dissatisfaction and went beyond Chou's complaint in a hard hitting commentary on the talks. It claimed that the negotiations have no prospect of progress, that Moscow was "refusing to hold talks," and that the USSR was attempting to coerce China into recognizing as Soviet territory areas along the frontier which Peking claims were occupied in violation of the 19th Century "unequal treaties." It echoed Chou's NPC call for Moscow to end its talk of "empty" treaties on non-use of force and non-aggression and to "sit down to negotiate seriously and do something to solve a bit of the problem."

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VIETNAM

DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES PROTEST USAF "SPECIALISTS" IN GVN

The DRV and PRG foreign ministries on 8 February protested the recent dispatch of U.S. Air Force "specialists" to South Vietnam to aid the ARVN as a new violation of the Paris agreement. The arrival of the U.S. military specialists also evoked a 6 February protest statement by the spokesman for the PRG delegation to the La Celle-Saint-Cloud Consultative Conference and several media reports replaying Vietnamese communist charges of continued U.S. "involvement" in South Vietnam. The two foreign ministry statements protesting the U.S. military personnel also interjected routine complaints that President Ford's recent request that Congress appropriate additional military assistance to South Vietnam was further evidence of U.S. intentions to pursue Vietnamization and "intensification" of the war.*

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement "strongly denounces and sternly condemns" the introduction of U.S. Air Force personnel from "Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea" into South Vietnam, characterizing the U.S. action as a "new and extremely serious step . . . in sabotaging" the Paris agreement. It describes this action as a violation of Articles 5 and 7 of the agreement which prohibit the introduction of U.S. military personnel and war materials into South Vietnam. Despite what it termed a Ford Administration assertion that the U.S. Air Force personnel would be there only temporarily, the DRV statement charged that this meant the Ford Administration was "repeating the process of intervention and aggression" that originally brought the United States into the Vietnam conflict. Urging the United States to end its "involvement" in South Vietnam, the statement made the now standard plea for the overthrow of Thieu and "company" and their replacement with an administration willing to implement the Paris agreement so that "serious" talks could be held with the PRG.

The PRG Foreign Ministry statement, citing 7 February remarks by U.S. State Department and Pentagon spokesmen that the presence of U.S. Air Force personnel in South Vietnam was not considered a violation of the Paris agreement, described these as tantamount

* Earlier Vietnamese communist reaction to President Ford's request for increased military aid to Saigon is discussed in the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, pages 1-4.

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to an admission that "since the signing of the Paris agreement, the United States has been stealthily introducing . . . military technicians . . . and military equipment into South Vietnam." While the PRG statement also called for an end to alleged U.S. "involvement" in Vietnam, it did not mention negotiations or demand the ouster of Thieu as part of the solution to the present impasse, as had the DRV statement. The PRG statement described the new dispatch of U.S. Air Force personnel and other Ford Administration actions to supply South Vietnam with more military aid as violations of Articles 4, 7, and 14 of the Paris agreement on Vietnam.

PRG EXCLUSION FROM GENEVA LAW CONFERENCE DRAWS ROUTINE COMMENT

The PRG's failure to gain admission to the second session of the Geneva conference on humanitarian law, convened on 3 February, has prompted lower-key reaction from the Vietnamese communists than a similar PRG failure at the first Geneva session.* Last year both the PRG and the DRV issued foreign ministry statements, but this year there was only a message to the conference chairman from PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh and routine media reportage. The content of this year's comment is similar to last year's, however, with charges that the U.S. Geneva delegation had engaged in "odious maneuvers" and a "war of procedures" to exclude PRG attendance.

Nguyen Thi Binh's message characterized the United States as seeking "all means to eliminate" the PRG and deny its existence internationally, but its overall assessment of international support seemed to reflect a note of optimism. Without offering further elaboration, Mme. Binh declared that a tendency has emerged in the international community to encourage the concept of two administrations in South Vietnam, as stipulated in the Paris agreement. She concluded by cryptically expressing "understanding to friends who sympathize with our ideas but could not vote for us for particular reasons." Nguyen Co Thach, head of the DRV delegation to the conference, was reported to have made similar remarks. In thanking those who had supported the PRG, he said he "deeply understood" the reasons some delegations had to vote "contrary to their true desire, even though supporting the PRG in their sentiments and consciences."

* For a discussion of the 1974 foreign ministry statements and media comment on the PRG's failure to gain entry to the first session of the conference, see the TRENDS of 6 March 1974, pages 12-14.

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During last year's debate on seating the PRG, there was evidence of some ambiguity as to whether the GVN's presence at the conference was to be tolerated. DRV Ambassador Nguyen Van Luu had been quoted by Liberation Radio as declaring that the Saigon delegates "must be ousted" and the PRG delegation authorized to attend. But this stand had been contradicted by previous remarks by Nguyen Thi Binh to a Swedish newspaper that the PRG did not protest participation by representatives of the South Vietnamese parties. This year's public discussion left no doubt that simultaneous PRG and GVN participation would be welcomed by the communists. Evidence of this was a 6 December note from Mme. Binh to conference chairman Pierre Graber on the PRG's desire to attend the conference, which stated: "We hope that both governments in South Vietnam . . . will be treated on an equal footing, that both governments will . . . be allowed to attend" DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's 28 December note to Chairman Graber similarly emphasized that either both the PRG and GVN should be allowed to attend or neither. That this was a change in tactics from last year was confirmed by the VNA correspondent's account of the debate. VNA noted that one reason for objecting to the call for a two-thirds vote on the issue was that this year's initiative to invite both South Vietnamese governments constituted a "new and completely different" motion from last year's motion, which only invited the PRG.

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J A P A N

MOSCOW, PEKING MANEUVER OVER PEACE TREATIES WITH TOKYO

Moscow and Peking, both engaged in diplomatic activities seeking an agreement on individual peace treaties with the Japanese Government, are each warning the Japanese against the other, while thus far avoiding direct criticism of Japan's handling of current negotiations. Soviet media treatment of the 15-17 January Moscow visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa for treaty talks has reflected Soviet caution about the prospects for an early signing, as well as the slow pace of negotiations because of the "northern territories" issue--Japan's claim upon four islands occupied by the USSR after World War II. Chinese media reflect more promising prospects for a Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship, a development Moscow is seeking to forestall by its recently launched campaign to discourage Japanese support for such a treaty.

MOSCOW COMMENT Available Soviet comment on Miyazawa's Moscow visit failed to mention the sensitive northern territories issue and virtually ignored the subject of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Instead, Soviet media concentrated on economic cooperation and portrayed the talks as primarily concerned with economic matters. In a 16 January speech at a banquet for Miyazawa, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko alluded indirectly to the northern territories issue, noting "there can be some points of disagreement" between the USSR and Japan. He did not indicate that the problems would be solved, however, but merely that a "businesslike, realistic approach" could "further expand areas of agreement and cooperation." A 19 February PRAVDA article, which was more optimistic about the "speediest conclusion" of a peace treaty, nevertheless echoed Gromyko in noting that "there are questions on which our positions do not coincide."

The joint communique following Miyazawa's visit referred to the desirability of "concluding a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty," but did not refer either directly or indirectly to the northern territories problem. The communique failed to repeat an indirect reference--contained in the October 1973 communique following former Prime Minister Tanaka's Moscow trip--which had noted "outstanding questions . . . left over since the time of the second world war."

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Obviously annoyed with the lack of progress in the Soviet-Japanese talks on a peace treaty precisely when Sino-Japanese talks on a similar agreement seem to be going ahead smoothly, Moscow has blasted Peking for meddling in Japanese domestic affairs by attempting to poison Japan against the Soviet Union. However, Moscow, rather than respond as it did last summer to Peking's frequent and barbed airing of Soviet-Japanese differences over the northern territories issue, has focused instead on undermining support for China in the leftist Japanese parties. It has repeated reports in the Japanese press which cite Chou En-lai, in discussions with a high-level Liberal-Democratic Party delegation, as praising Japanese military forces and welcoming closer U.S.-Japanese military ties. A 29 January PRAVDA article quoted the JAPAN TIMES as saying Chou's comments had clearly shown the Japan Socialist Party that it could not count on his support for its policy of unarmed neutrality. A 4 February Moscow commentary to Japan called Chou's comments "bitterly antagonistic" to Japan's "progressive forces, including the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party." While this commentary stated "there must be no opposition to the development of Japanese-Chinese relations, including the concluding of a peace treaty," it warned that there must be an "absolute condition"--that neither party "entertain designs" against peace and security in Asia and that neither use the normalizing of relations to "inflict a loss on third countries."

PEKING COMMENT Peking has emphasized Tokyo's public commitment to an early conclusion of a Sino-Japanese agreement and has not publicly reflected any concern over progress toward an agreement. The only hint of possible obstacles to a treaty in PRC official media was a 28 January NCNA report which quoted the chairman of the opposition Komeito party as saying that in Japan "there is a force which does not welcome the conclusion of such a treaty." However, following Japanese press reports that the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo was advising Japan to reconsider its views on concluding a peace treaty with the Chinese, TA KUNG PAO--a PRC-controlled paper in Hong Kong sometimes used to air Peking's views--published an article on 5 February concerning "meddling" by both Moscow and Taipei in the Sino-Japanese treaty. While noting that treaty talks were "going smoothly" and that they could be concluded in the "near future," TA KUNG PAO charged that Taiwan and the USSR were "directly and indirectly ganging up" and "seeking to sway Japanese authorities" on the treaty.

Peking reports on negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo have emphasized Japan's firm stand against the Soviets. Following Miyazawa's trip, Peking reported Japanese firmness on a number of

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issues, including the northern territories, fishing, and Asian collective security. The recent Peking reports reflected less urgency than those of last summer. For example, a 5 February NCNA commentary on the northern territories dispute did not raise the specter of a Soviet military threat to Japan coming from Soviet possession of the contested northern islands. Instead it stressed that Moscow would not let go of Japanese territory lest it serve as a bad precedent for other claims, in Asia or Europe, against the Soviet Union. Peking also has recently ignored the issue of joint Soviet-Japanese economic projects in Siberia, which it previously had portrayed as a plot to "pull Japan to the Soviet side," evidently reflecting the current Soviet-Japanese stalemate on this question.

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K O R E A

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF STRESSES LOYALTY TO KIM IL-SONG

A major address by Chief of Staff General O Chin-u marking the 8 February 27th anniversary of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) was notable for its unprecedented candor regarding the army's loyalty to Kim Il-song. While strongly emphasizing KPA loyalty, O Chin-u's speech, broadcast by Pyongyang on the 7th, revealed that in the past "sectarian elements schemed to separate the KPA from the direct command of the leader, and thus caused the situation within and without to deteriorate further." He indicted "traitors" for spreading "reactionary" ideas of "revisionism, doctrinairism, and flunkeyism"--terms which the North Koreans use to criticize reliance on outside methods and ideas--and stressed that the army remained steadfast in its loyalty to Kim and the party.

The chief of staff's comments possibly refer to the 1968 purge of former Defense Minister Kim Chang-pong, and his stress on loyalty may indicate continuing problems. One likely topic of debate within the army is over budget allocations and the need for expensive foreign technical and material assistance. Since 1971, Army Day comment has called for combat equipment to meet the "actual conditions" of the country, and again this year O Chin-u called for combat equipment to meet the "real situation of our country and . . . tactical demand of the party." DPRK comment on KPA anniversaries since 1970 has underlined the theme of strengthened political work in the army, but has provided less detail of struggles.

O Chin-u, reflecting Pyongyang's hardening public stance towards Seoul, noted that overthrowing the Pak clique was one requirement for achieving the country's reunification. His remarks were the closest a North Korean official has come in recent years to calling expressly for the Pak government's overthrow. The general censured the United States and Japan along standard North Korean lines. Included in his comments was criticism of the United States for keeping nuclear weapons in South Korea, a charge DPRK media have raised frequently in recent months.

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PERU

MOSCOW, HAVANA SEE "IMPERIALIST PLOT" IN RECENT DISORDERS

In the wake of 5-6 February riots in Peru--the most serious disorders since President Juan Velasco's military government assumed power in 1968--Moscow and Havana have expressed continued support for the government and have charged "reactionaries" and "imperialists" with responsibility.* Moscow's Spanish-language broadcasts, ignoring U.S. State Department denials of involvement by "the CIA or any other agency" of the U.S. Government, blamed the disturbances on "the forces which organized the fascist coup in Chile"--the CIA and "counterrevolutionaries." Along the same lines, Havana quoted the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and the government-controlled LA CRONICA as implicating both the CIA and the Velasco regime's old enemy, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). Havana seemed especially anxious to link "imperialists" with the middle-of-the-road APRA, probably the only Peruvian party with sufficient mass support to threaten the military government.

BACKGROUND OF EVENTS On 3 February Lima policemen demanding salary increases occupied a police headquarters building, and two days later, the military government moved to crush the police strike with tanks, precipitating violent demonstrations which the government was slow to bring under control. The disorders were the second recent threat to the regime, which has faced few challenges in its six-year tenure. The other event was an apparent assassination attempt against Prime Minister Edgardo Mercado Jarrin on 1 December last year. This abortive attempt also brought a PCP accusation of CIA involvement, replayed by PRENSA LATINA on 4 December.

MOSCOW COMMENT Moscow's domestic service on the 6th, in the only available Russian-language commentary on the 5-6 February disturbances, explained to the home audience that "counterrevolutionary forces" has used the police strike as a pretext for antigovernment actions. It claimed that Peruvian reactionaries "relied on terror with increasing determination" because of their fear of the government's progressive programs. In a series of Spanish-language broadcasts Moscow reminded Latin

* For a discussion of the Soviet media's favorable treatment of the Peruvian regime, see the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, pages 15-16.

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American listeners that "the imperialist plot" against Peru threatened the independence of "any state in Latin America." Thus on 7 February Valentin Petrov commented that "the imperialist monopolies of the CIA, the Pentagon and its agents" had "unleashed psychological warfare" in Peru, describing this as their usual tactic in fighting liberation movements in Latin America. On the 8th, Moscow's unofficial Radio Peace and Progress again hammered home the theme of the necessity of Latin unity against imperialism, noting that "the forces which organized the fascist coup in Chile" were now hoping to "transfer" Peru to the reactionary camp and thus "change the balance of power throughout Latin America."

HAVANA In an initial reaction on the 7th, PRENSA LATINA
COVERAGE asserted that "there is proof of foreign involvement" in the Lima events and quoted LA CRONICA, which purported to have knowledge of a police conspiracy "organized under direct CIA sponsorship," as well as "personal testimony" of APRA's participation in the riots. Elaborating on the theme of CIA-APRA villainy, Our America commentator Manolo Ortega stated on the 9th that "domestic reactionaries and imperialism" had worked together to crush "the struggle of peoples for their final liberation." Havana, like Moscow, has followed the Peruvian Government's lead in indicating that calm has been restored, and Ortega concluded by assuring listeners that the government had quickly crushed the "gangs of criminals and counterrevolutionaries" who briefly threatened the country.

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NOTES

CEMA-EC RELATIONS: Moscow has reflected optimism in reporting the 4-6 February meeting in the Soviet capital between representatives of CEMA and the EC, although Western reports indicate that the two sides achieved little beyond a decision to hold another meeting at some further date. TASS' report on the 7th stressed at the outset that "progress" had been achieved at the Moscow session in preparing for "the forthcoming meeting of the leaders" of the two economic organizations. The Polish daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 6th identified a major facet of the current CEMA-EC impasse when it noted that "according to some views, Common Market members prefer to deal with the individual CEMA states," rather than with the organization as a whole. But the paper purported to believe that the EC's agreement to attend the recent Moscow meeting indicates that the organization is taking a "more realistic" stance on this issue. The TASS report on the meeting contained the first reference in Soviet media to EC Commission Chairman Ortoli's visit to Moscow late last year and to CEMA Secretary Fadeyev's Copenhagen visit in August 1973--visits which had been reported by East as well as West European media. Brezhnev had first called for organizational ties between CEMA and the Common Market in December 1972, but the notion was not mentioned at an official Soviet level again until the joint statement issued at the conclusion of FRG Chancellor Schmidt's Moscow visit last October.

MOSCOW ON ETHIOPIA: Routine Soviet media treatment of the conflict in Ethiopia between government forces and secessionist Eritrean guerrillas has glossed over the gravity and scale of fighting, obscured the causes of current hostilities, and thus far has reflected a pro-military government bias. TASS reports on recent fighting in the Eritrean provincial capital, Asmara, have closely adhered to the official line of the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Committee (PMAC). For example, on 10 February TASS cited government-controlled Ethiopian News Agency reports that Asmara was returning to "normal" and that public services had been restored, despite subsequent Western news agency reports that intermittent fighting was continuing. Soviet comment has distorted and oversimplified the causes of the Eritrean conflict by lumping all antigovernment forces into one broad category and avoiding any distinction between the several factions in the dissident ranks. The rebels have been condemned by Moscow for their opposition to the PMAC's announced program of socialist development and nationalization of key economic sectors, but Moscow has not mentioned the cultural,

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religious, and political aspects of the rebels' demands for autonomy. A 5 February commentary on Moscow's ostensibly "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Africa praised the PMAC's nationalization policy while noting that internal reactionaries and subversive elements, "encouraged from the outside," were attempting to sabotage implementation of "progressive" measures designed to break down the feudal structures of Ethiopian society.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 FEBRUARY 1975

Moscow (2673 items)

Gromyko in Mideast	(4%)	13%
[Egypt Visit	(--)	8%]
[Syria Visit	(4%)	3%]
China	(5%)	6%
Brezhnev Congratula-	(--)	3%
tions to Indian CP		
Leaders on Re-election		

Peking (1052 items)

Vietnam Workers Party	(1%)	7%
45th Anniversary		
Trinidad and Tobago Prime	(1%)	6%
Minister Williams in PRC		
Developing Countries Raw	(--)	4%
Materials Conference,		
Dakar		
USSR	(3%)	4%
Economic Crisis in the	(2%)	3%
West		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.